The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I study how the proportion of …xed and variable-rate mortgages in an economy can a¤ect the way shocks are propagated. Second, I analyze optimal implementable simple monetary policy rules and the welfare implications of this proportion. I develop and solve a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that features a housing market and a group of constrained individuals who need housing collateral to obtain loans. A given proportion of constrained households borrows at a variable rate, while the rest borrows at a …xed rate.
Introduction
Mortgage contracts in an economy can be …xed or variable rate. The proportion of variable-rate mortgages varies from country to country. In countries such as the United States, Germany and France, the majority of mortgages are …xed rate. However, the predominant type of mortgages in countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia and Spain is variable.
Mortgage rate changes a¤ect the amount of mortgage interest payments, causing a direct cash‡ow e¤ect on consumption. Interest rate changes also a¤ect housing demand and housing prices. If households are using housing as a collateral, the value of this collateral changes, inducing a wealth e¤ect on household behavior and indirectly a¤ecting consumption (ECB (2003) , ). Interest rate shocks a¤ect mortgage rates di¤erently depending on whether the mortgage is …xed or variable rate.
Variable-rate mortgages are mortgage loans for which the interest rate is adjusted periodically, typically in line with some measured short-term interest rate. Hence, interest rate shocks directly a¤ect variable rates. In contrast, …xed-rate mortgages are mortgage loans for which the interest rate remains constant through the term of the loan. The …xed interest rate is tied to a longer-term interest rate and is less sensitive to changes in the policy rate.
This raises important questions: How does the mortgage rate structure a¤ect the way macroeconomic shocks are propagated? What are the implications in terms of monetary policy and welfare? These questions are of academic and policy interest. To give an illustrative example, the United Kingdom Treasury explicitly mentions the di¤erence in mortgage structures as an important reason not to join the euro area. In the UK, the vast majority of borrowers have variable-rate mortgages, as opposed to the large countries of the euro area. According to the UK Treasury, British households are more exposed to monetary policy changes than, say, German households , Miles (2004) ).
To address these questions, I build a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints to explore how shocks are propagated in the presence of mortgage heterogeneity. I introduce …xed and variable-rate mortgages in the model. For the proportion of variablerate mortgages to matter via the direct, cash- ‡ow e¤ect of mortgage interest payments on consumption, borrowers and savers are needed. Then, the e¤ect of interest rate changes on borrowing does not cancel out by the presence of a representative consumer. For the indirect, wealth e¤ect to appear, one needs non-durable consumption to be related to house prices. The introduction of collateral constraints tied to housing value for one type of consumers solves both problems since it motivates the presence of borrowers and savers and relates housing prices to consumption. In this model, monetary policy has real e¤ects that are comparable with other sticky-price models. Furthermore, since the model is microfounded it allows me to study optimal monetary policy and welfare. 1 It is not the aim of this paper to explain how the decision between …xed and variable-rate mortgages is made. 2 For simplicity, I hold the proportion of …xed and variable-rate borrowers constant and exogenous.
Although this proportion can vary in reality, there is evidence that it ‡uctuates around a constant mean which is higher or lower depending on the country. 3 We could think of these cross-country di¤erences as due to institutional, historical or cultural factors, out of the scope of this model. 4 I use the model to compute impulse responses to interest rate, in ‡ation target and technology shocks.
I consider two extreme cases; one in which the economy is composed by variable-rate borrowers and one where the …xed rate is the predominant type of mortgage.
Results show that interest rate shocks a¤ect more strongly those borrowers that have variable-rate mortgages. Given an increase in the interest rate set by the central bank, variable-rate borrowers reduce their consumption and housing demand by more than …xed-rate borrowers. The intuition is as follows:
After a monetary policy shock (increase in the interest rate), …xed and variable-rate consumers di¤er in the real interest rate they face. Consider the most extreme case in which the variable rate changes one for one with the interest rate set by the central bank and the …xed rate is constant. After the shock, the nominal mortgage rate increases for the variable-rate individuals and in ‡ation decreases. For the …xed-rate borrowers, the nominal mortgage interest rate does not react, but in ‡ation is still decreasing 1 The analysis of optimal monetary policy is restricted to optimization over parameters of a simple implementable Taylor rule. 2 See Miles (2004) or Campbell and Cocco (2003) for studies that cover this from a microeconomic perspective. 3 See Appendix 1 for evidence for the UK and the US. 4 The European Mortgage Federation (EMF) highlights that cultural di¤erences play an important role for the predominant type of mortgage contract in a country. They are linked to real estate law, borrowers'risk aversion, funding system or frequency of house moves. because the economy is contracting. As a result, real rates increase by more if the mortgage is variable rate. In real terms, payments are increasing by more for variable-rate consumers, and their consumption and housing decrease by more (this is a pure cash- ‡ow e¤ect). A second, wealth e¤ect comes through the collateral constraint. Banks are willing to lend as long as debt repayments do not exceed a …xed proportion of the value of the house collateral. For borrowers with variable-rate mortgages the value of their collateral has been reduced by more since they are demanding less houses. These e¤ects make consumption decrease more strongly for variable-rate borrowers.
Aggregate consumption also declines by more after a monetary policy shock when the economy is mainly borrowing at a variable rate. However, aggregate di¤erences are more muted due to the behavior of savers. In equilibrium, borrowing and saving must be equal. If borrowing decreases, saving must also decrease. Savers are the owners of …nancial intermediaries in the model, so any loss for the borrowers is a gain for the savers. These manage to o¤set part of the decrease in consumption following a positive interest rate shock. Results for monetary policy shocks are very robust to di¤erent model speci…cations.
Some aggregate di¤erences arise because the borrowers' marginal propensity to consume is larger than the savers'. 5 However, aggregate di¤erences are not larger due to several reasons; First, results are sensitive to the borrowers´share. Increasing the size of this group would amplify the di¤erences.
Second, income e¤ects on labor supply are important in this model. With the type of preferences used in standard real business cycle models, labor e¤ort is determined together with the intertemporal consumption choice. When consumption is reduced, individuals tend to work more to compensate and smooth consumption. Variable-rate consumers increase their labor to compensate for the extra reduction in consumption they su¤er when there is an interest rate shock. Using preferences as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988)(GHH henceforth), this e¤ect is eliminated. In this case, the channels that are important for the purposes of this paper are emphasized and aggregate e¤ects are larger. Finally, persistence is also a key element here. Interest rate shocks are not very persistent, more persistent shocks such as in ‡ation target or technology shocks amplify the di¤erences.
When the in ‡ation target increases, output responds by more when variable rates are predominant.
Real interest rates fall persistently and house prices increase by less than with …xed mortgage rates.
Variable-rate borrowers increase their nondurable consumption by more. Since house prices do not increase as much in the variable-rate case, also savers can consume more nondurables. 5 In this model borrowers face collateral constraints and are more impatient than savers. This makes their consumption respond by more to changes in wealth.
With respect to technology shocks, a favorable technology shock increases output and lowers prices.
Monetary policy responds in a persistent way and real rates increase. Variable-rate borrowers consume less because the real rate increase a¤ects them and dampens the positive e¤ects of the technology shock for them. The increase in real rates does not a¤ect …xed-rate consumers as much and they can consume more. Output increases by more when …xed rates are predominant.
I also study welfare and optimal monetary policy in the context of …xed and variable-rate mortgages.
In particular, I search over parameters of a simple, implementable interest rate rule so that welfare is maximized. I …nd that, in the presence of collateral constraints, a social welfare maximizing central bank should respond to in ‡ation less aggressively than in the absence of collateral constraints. Results also show that when the central bank focuses only on the savers' welfare, thus ignoring the collateral constraint, the optimized in ‡ation parameter in the Taylor rule is higher. However, when borrowers are taking into account, the central bank optimally responds less to in ‡ation. The central bank faces a trade-o¤ between the borrowers and savers'welfare because on the one hand, low in ‡ation corrects the sticky-price distortion but, on the other hand, in ‡ation relaxes the collateral constraint and improves borrowers'welfare. Comparing welfare across mortgage rate scenarios for given policy shows that this in ‡ation channel is more e¤ective the higher the proportion of …xed-rate mortgages in the economy.
Therefore, borrowers are better o¤ with …xed-rate mortgages although this comes at the cost of lower welfare for savers. For aggregate welfare, I …nd that predominantly …xed-rate contracts are welfare enhancing.
This paper relates to di¤erent strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on New
Keynesian general equilibrium models with housing and collateral constraints such as Aoki et al. (2004) and Iacoviello (2005) , who do not consider heterogeneous mortgage contracts. Second, it is also related to a literature that studies …xed and variable-rate mortgages. Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Miles (2004) study the …xed versus variable rate choice from a partial equilibrium perspective. Graham and Wright (2007) develop a model in which some households face binding credit constraints and debt contracts can be …xed or variable rate. However, they do not include a housing market and thus the constraint is not tied to housing stock and housing prices, eliminating the wealth channel. 
The Baseline Model
I consider an in…nite-horizon economy in which households consume, work and demand real estate. There is a representative …nancial intermediary that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from consumers.
Firms set prices subject to Calvo (1983)-Yun (1996) nominal rigidity. The monetary authority sets interest rates endogenously, in response to in ‡ation and output, following a Taylor rule.
The Consumer' s Problem
There are three types of consumers: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers who borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a …xed rate. Constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from the …nancial intermediary. Interest payments for both mortgages and loans cannot exceed a proportion of the future value of the current house stock. In this way, the …nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going to be able to ful…ll their debt obligations next period. As in Iacoviello (2005) , I assume that constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones. This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding, so that constrained individuals do not save and wait until they have the funds to self-…nance their consumption. This generates an economy in which households divide into borrowers and savers.
Furthermore, borrowers are divided into two groups, those who borrow at a …xed rate and those who borrow at a variable rate. The proportion of each type of borrower is …xed and exogenous. All households derive utility from consumption, housing services assumed proportional to the housing stock and leisure. 6 
Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers maximize:
where the superscript u stands for "unconstrained", E 0 is the expectation operator, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, and C u t , H u t and L u t are consumption at t, the stock of housing and hours worked, respectively; 1= ( 1) is the labor supply elasticity, > 0 and j > 0 represents the weight of housing in the utility function.
The budget constraint is:
where q t is the real housing price and w u t is the real wage for unconstrained consumers. These can buy houses or sell them at the current price q t . I assume zero housing depreciation for simplicity. As we will see, this group will choose not to borrow at all; they are the savers in this economy. b u t is the amount they save. They receive interest R t 1 for their savings. t is in ‡ation in period t. S t and F t are lump-sum pro…ts received from the …rms and the …nancial intermediary, respectively. We can think of these consumers as the wealthy agents in the economy, who own the …rms and the …nancial intermediary.
The …rst-order conditions for this unconstrained group are:
Equation ( 
Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers can be of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who do it at a …xed rate. The di¤erence between them is simply the interest rate they face. The …xed-rate borrower faces R t , set by the …nancial intermediary, whereas the variable-rate counterpart faces R t , set by the central bank. The proportion of variable-rate consumers is …xed and exogenous and equal to 2 [0; 1].
Constrained and unconstrained consumers are di¤erent in the way they discount the future. Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones. I assume that constrained consumers face a limit on the debt they can acquire. The maximum amount they can borrow is proportional to the value of their collateral, in this case the stock of housing. That is, the debt repayment next period cannot exceed a proportion of tomorrow's value of today's stock of housing:
where (6) represents the collateral constraint for the variable-rate constrained consumer and (7) is the constraint for the …xed-rate one.
Without loss of generality, I present the problem for the variable-rate borrower, since the one for the …xed-rate is symmetric. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function subject to the budget constraint and the collateral constraint:
subject to:
and (6). 7 As noted above, constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, so that e < .
This assumption is crucial for the borrowing constraint to be binding and therefore, for there to be both borrowers and savers in the economy. 7 We will see from the …rm's problem that w The …rst-order conditions for variable-rate constrained consumers are:
These …rst-order conditions di¤er from those of the unconstrained individuals. In the case of constrained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint ( cv t ) appears in equations (10) and (12) . From the Euler equations for consumption of unconstrained consumers, we know that R = 1=
in steady state. If we combine this result with the Euler equation for consumption of constrained individuals we have that cv = e =C cv > 0 in steady state. This means that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in steady state. Since we log-linearize the model around the steady state and assume that uncertainty is low, we can generalize this result to o¤-steady-state dynamics. Then, the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals are going to borrow the maximum amount they are allowed to and unconstrained consumers are never in debt. 8 Given the borrowing amount implied by (6) at equality, consumption for variable-rate constrained individuals can be determined by their ‡ow of funds:
and the …rst-order condition for housing becomes:
Aggregate Variables
Given the fraction of variable-rate borrowers, we can de…ne aggregates across constrained consumers
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates are:
In this model, aggregate supply of housing is …xed, so that market clearing requires 9 :
The Financial Intermediary
The …nancial intermediary accepts deposits from savers, and extends both …xed and variable-rate loans to borrowers. The pro…ts of the …nancial intermediary are:
To simplify, since the typical time horizon of a mortgage is large, I consider the maturity of mortgages to be in…nite, although this assumption is not crucial for the dynamics of the problem.
In equilibrium, aggregate borrowing and saving must be equal, that is,
Substituting (16) into (15) ;we obtain,
I assume that the …nancial intermediary operates under perfect competition. Therefore, the optimality condition for the …nancial intermediary implies that at each point in time , the intermediary is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or …xed rate. Hence, the expected discounted pro…ts that the intermediary obtains by lending new debt in a given period at a …xed interest rate must be equal to the expected discounted pro…ts the intermediary would obtain by lending it at variable rate:
is the unconstrained consumer relevant discount factor. Since the …nancial intermediary is owned by the savers, their stochastic discount factor is applied to the …nancial intermediary's problem.
We can obtain the optimal value of the …xed rate in period from expression (18) :
Equation ( 19) states that, for every new debt issued at date , there is a di¤erent …xed interest rate that has to be equal to a discounted average of future variable interest rates. Notice that this is not a condition on the stock of debt, but on the new amount obtained in a given period. New debt at a given point in time is associated with a di¤erent …xed interest rate. Both the …xed interest rate in period and the new amount of debt in period are …xed for all future periods. However, the …xed interest rate varies with the date the debt was issued, so that in every period there is a new …xed interest rate associated with new debt in this period. If we consider …xed-rate loans to be long-term, the …nancial intermediary obtains interest payments every period from the whole stock of debt, not only from the new ones. Hence, we can de…ne an aggregate …xed interest rate that is the one the …nancial intermediary e¤ectively charges every period. This aggregate …xed interest rate is composed of all past …xed interest rates and past debt, together with the current period optimal …xed interest rate and new amount of debt. Therefore, the e¤ective …xed interest rate that the …nancial intermediary charges for the stock of …xed-rate debt every period is:
Equation (20) states that the …xed interest rate that the …nancial intermediary is actually charging today is an average of what it charged last period for the previous stock of mortgages and what it charges this period for the new amount. Importantly, this assumption is not crucial for results. Both R and R t are practically una¤ected by interest rate shocks. This assumption is a way to reconcile the model with the fact that …xed-rate loans are not one-period assets but longer term ones.
As noted above, if any, pro…ts from …nancial intermediation are rebated to the unconstrained consumers every period. Even if the …nancial intermediary is competitive and it does not make pro…ts in absence of shocks, if there is a shock at a given point in time, the fact that only the variable interest rate is a¤ected can generate non-zero pro…ts.
Firms 2.3.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical …nal goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The …nal good …rm chooses Y t (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
The price index is then given by:
Market clearing for the …nal good requires:
Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005) , intermediate goods are produced according to the production function:
where 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor. This Cobb-Douglas production function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect substitutes. This speci…cation is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady state of the model. This assumption can be economically justi…ed by the fact that savers are the managers of the …rms and their wage is higher than the one of the borrowers. 10 Experimenting with a production 1 0 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, therefore more experienced.
function in which hours are substitutes leads to very similar results in terms of model dynamics. In the appendix, I derive the model under this alternative assumption and show that both are comparable.
Under the Cobb-Douglas speci…cation each household has mass one. is a constant that represents the labor income share of the patient household and L u t are total hours worked by the patient household.
In the alternative speci…cation derived in the appendix, !L u t represents the total hours worked by the patient household while ! is the fraction of savers in the population. Therefore, both speci…cations are very similar but, while represents the economic size of savers, ! is its absolute size.
A t represents technology and it follows the following autorregressive process:
where A is the autorregressive coe¢ cient and u At is a normally distributed shock to technology.
Labor demand is determined by:
where X t is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost. 11 The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An intermediate good producer sells its good at price P t (z) ; and 1 ; 2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
The aggregate price level is then given by:
Using (28) and (29) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve which is presented in the Appendix. 1 1 Symmetry across …rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
Monetary Policy
The model is closed with a Taylor Rule with interest rate smoothing, to describe the conduct of monetary policy by the central bank: 12
where 0 1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, and > 0 measures the response of interest rates to current in ‡ation. R is the steady-state values of the interest rate. " Rt is a white noise shock with zero mean and variance 2 " . t is the in ‡ation target that evolves according to:
where " t is normally distributed with variance 2 :
3 Shock Transmission and Business Cycles of Funds data. 13 I set = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of 1: 14 For the loan-tovalue ratio, I pick = 0:9, consistent with the evidence that in the last years borrowing constrained consumers borrowed on average more than 90% of the value of their house. 15 The labor income share 1 2 This is a realistic policy benchmark for most of the industrialized countries. A more realistic rule would also include output but it complicates building intuition about the workings of the model. Furthermore, estimations deliver a small response to the output gap in the last two decades (See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)). 1 3 See Table B .100. In this model, consumption is the only component of GDP. To make the ratio comparable with the data I multiply it by 0.6, which is approximately what nondurable consumption and services account for in the GDP, according to the data in the NIPA tables. 1 4 Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%. 1 5 We can identify constrained consumers with those that borrow more than 80% of their home. In the US, among those borrowers, the average LTV ratio exceeds 90% for the period 1973-2006. See the data from the Federal Housing Finance of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005) . I pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. This value implies a steady state markup of 1:2. The probability of not changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters. For the Taylor Rule parameters I use = 0:8, = 0:5: The …rst value re ‡ects a realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing. 16 The second one, is consistent with the original parameter proposed by Taylor in 1993. For , I consider two polar cases for comparison. In the …rst case, the proportion of variable-rate mortgages in the economy is 0, that is, all constrained consumers in the economy borrow at a …xed rate. In the second case, the proportion of variable-rate mortgages is 1. 
Impulse Responses

Monetary Policy Shock
Impulse responses to a one standard deviation (0.29 percent) increase of the interest rate are presented in Figure 1 . 17 We can see that when the economy is mainly composed by individuals indebted at a variable-rate, the e¤ects of monetary policy on consumption for the borrowers are stronger than in the …xed-rate case. Borrowers' housing demand, initially, also decreases more strongly after a monetary policy shock if the predominant type of mortgages in the economy is variable rate. These …ndings show that the proportion of variable-rate mortgages matters for the monetary transmission mechanism. When the proportion of variable-rate borrowers is very high, a monetary policy shock a¤ects more strongly those individuals who are constrained and need to borrow.
Board. In the aggregate, output in the variable-rate economy also decreases more strongly (See Figure 2 ).
There is a redistribution between borrowers and savers but we can still …nd aggregate di¤erences because borrowers are more sensitive to changes in wealth (they are more impatient and use housing wealth as collateral).
Results for monetary policy shocks with standard preferences are very robust to alternative model speci…cations. We can introduce capital in the basic model or assume nonseparability between housing and consumption in the utility function. The basic results for the variables of interest are maintained. 18 Relative Sizes and Income E¤ects on Labor Supply Di¤erences between the two scenarios are not larger for several reasons; First, results are sensitive to the wage share of unconstrained individuals in the economy. 19 Figure 3 shows that by decreasing the size of the savers aggregate di¤erences are ampli…ed.
Second, in this model income e¤ects on the labor supply decision are important. In the baseline model preferences are separable in consumption and labor. In this case, the labor supply decision depends on the level of consumption. Given a negative shock to the economy, labor supply moves both in response to a substitution and an income e¤ect. On the one hand, lower wages make consumers want to work less. On the other hand, lower consumption generates an income e¤ect that makes consumers want to work more. Income e¤ects can partly o¤set aggregate di¤erences. GHH preferences have the property of shutting down the income e¤ect on the labor supply decision. In this preferences, labor and consumption are non-separable. This makes labor e¤ort to be determined independently from the intertemporal consumption-savings choice. 20 There an extensive literature that has also used these preferences to emphasize other channels that are partially o¤set by this income e¤ects. 21 Impulse responses, in line with other studies that use GHH preferences, show how consumption responses are stronger and aggregate di¤erences are ampli…ed (See Figure 4) . 
In ‡ation Target Shock
Instead of a shock to the interest rate, we can also consider a more persistent monetary policy disturbance such as a shock to the in ‡ation target. Figure 5 shows the responses of the variables of interest to an increase in the in ‡ation target of 0.1 percent, with 0.975 persistence. 22 Aggregate di¤erences are ampli…ed with this type of shock. 23 In particular, output increases by more in the variable-rate case. Shock persistence is a key issue in the analysis. In the case of exogenous interest rate shocks we have seen that unless we unrealistically increase the borrowers share or use GHH preferences, there is no much di¤erence, at the aggregate level, between the two mortgage contracts. A change in the interest rate that does not last long creates an initial wedge between the rates that the two di¤erent borrowers face but it fades away very fast. However, we also have to take into account the endogenous component of monetary policy. Interest rates also respond to other shocks to the economy.
And the more persistent are these other shocks, the more persistent is the response of monetary policy.
A persistent change in the policy interest rate makes the wedge between the two mortgage rates also persist and it ampli…es the di¤erences.
When there is an in ‡ation target shock, interest rates respond systematically to the shock in a very persistent way. In particular, an increase in the in ‡ation target, since it is an expansionary measure, makes in ‡ation and output increase. The nominal interest rate increases persistently but real rates fall.
House prices increase by less in the variable-rate economy. Variable-rate borrowers increase by more their nondurable consumption because real rates fall. Since house prices do not increase that much in the variable-rate case, also savers can consume more nondurables. In the aggregate, the combination of these two elements makes the variable-rate economy respond more strongly to the shock.
Technology Shock
A shock to technology may also have di¤erent e¤ects on the economy depending on whether individuals are mainly borrowing at variable or …xed rate. Impulse responses to a 1 percent positive shock to technology with 0.9 persistence are showed in Figure 6 . 24 We see that the economy responds more strongly after a technology shock when the majority of its borrowers have a …xed-rate mortgage and the di¤erences across scenarios are larger than in the exogenous monetary policy disturbance case. The argument is similar to the in ‡ation target shock. The systematic part of monetary policy responds to the technology shock and, since this is a persistent shock, this creates a persistent wedge between …xed and variable rates.
In particular, we can see in the …gure that a positive technology shock increases output and lowers prices. As a reaction, nominal rates decrease persistently but real interest rates increase. Variablerate borrowers consume less because increase in real rate a¤ects them negatively. However, …xed-rate consumers are better o¤ in comparison and they can consume more. Responses for savers do not di¤er much across scenarios and then, the redistribution e¤ect between borrowers and savers is not as strong as in this case of monetary policy shocks. As a result, output increases by more for …xed-rate consumers.
Comparing across shocks, it is interesting to note that monetary policy shocks or in ‡ation target shocks cause the real interest rate to vary countercyclically, which is why ‡exible-rate mortgages amplify the e¤ects those shocks. Technology shocks, by contrast, cause the real interest rate to vary procyclically:
it rises when output rises, which is why ‡exible-rate mortgages dampen the e¤ects of those shocks. Table 2 shows the standard deviations of the main variable both from the model and the data. 25 The model generates a standard deviation of GDP of 2.0127 for the variable-rate case and 2.126 for the …xed-rate economy. This is slightly smaller but close to the data (2.26), especially for the …xed-rate economy. 26 The volatility of consumption and housing demand is always greater for those individuals that are constrained but smaller in the case of variable rates. The volatility of in ‡ation and house prices is smaller in the model than in the data while the correlation between output and house prices is greater. 
Second Moments
Welfare and Optimal Monetary Policy
So far, I have described the model dynamics under the two types of mortgage contracts. However, this does not allow to answer question such as "what is better for the economy, …xed or variablerate mortgages?", or "is the optimal monetary policy di¤erent depending on the predominant type of mortgage in the economy?". In this section, I complement the previous analysis with some normative assessment. In particular, I compare di¤erent simple monetary policy rules based on welfare evaluations, both for the whole economy and for di¤erent types of consumers. I also compare welfare for the two scenarios for given policy rule.
The individual welfare for savers and borrowers respectively is de…ned as follows: 27
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), I de…ne social welfare as a weighted sum of individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Borrowers and savers'welfare are weighted by 1 e and (1 ) respectively, so that the two groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007) , I take this approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the three types of agents separately. 28 To begin, I evaluate the welfare achieved under the ad-hoc Taylor rule used in the baseline model.
Results are presented in Table 3 :
Ad-hoc Taylor Rule: = 0:8; = 0:5 The economy with …xed-rate mortgages achieves a higher level of welfare than the variable-rate economy. Notice as well that there is a trade-o¤ between savers and borrowers' welfare: Although a is relaxed when mortgage rates are …xed, and thus their welfare is higher. If we look at the loglinearized collateral constraint (see equation (46) in Appendix 2), we can observe that, at a given level of in ‡ation, in real terms, mortgage payments are lower, the lower the value of is: As a result of this trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers, the economy achieves the maximum level of social welfare at around the value of = 0:3; that is, when 70 percent of the mortgages are …xed rate. Then, in this economy in which there are two types of distortions (price rigidities and credit frictions), …xed-rate contracts are welfare enhancing …rst because they decrease the distorting e¤ects of the borrowing constraint and second because borrowers do not bear the risk associated to the interest rate variability.
Next, I study what is the monetary policy that maximizes welfare. The design of optimal monetary policy in the presence of collateral constraints is more complicated than in the standard sticky-price setting. As I mentioned, there are two types of distortions. On the one hand, the central bank should aim at lowering in ‡ation volatility because, given sticky prices, in ‡ation distorts production decisions.
On the other hand, in ‡ation relaxes the borrowing constraints and improves the borrowers' welfare.
However, as noticed above, this in ‡ation channel is much more e¤ective when …xed-rate mortgages are predominant. The loglinearized collateral constraint shows that mortgage payments decrease with in ‡ation but increase with the interest rate. In ‡ation relaxes the collateral constraint for borrowers, as long as the interest rate does not react too much to it. Therefore, the in ‡ation channel for borrower welfare is stronger the less the central bank responds to in ‡ation but also the lower the value of : In the limit, an economy with just …xed-rate mortgages maximizes the favorable e¤ects of in ‡ation on the collateral constraint.
Monacelli (2006) and Mendicino and Pescatori (2007) perform a full-blown optimal monetary policy analysis in a model with collateral constraints. They …nd that in the presence of credit frictions, the aggressiveness towards in ‡ation by the central bank is reduced. I perform a simple exercise here that also allows me to distinguish between mortgage contracts. In particular, given a grid of possible parameters for the Taylor rule, I perform a search that maximizes welfare, subject to determinacy requirements.
For simplicity, I start by keeping the value of …xed to 0.8 and I search over di¤erent values of , the response coe¢ cient to in ‡ation. In this way, I can build intuition about on much the central bank should respond to in ‡ation in di¤erent cases for the same degree of interest-rate smoothing. Results are presented in Table 4 : Table 5 shows results for an optimized Taylor rule in which I search for both the values of and so that welfare is maximized. Again in this case we can clearly see that the optimal response to in ‡ation by the central bank is less aggressive in the presence of collateral constraints.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have developed a New Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints to study …rst, how the proportion of variable-rate mortgages in the economy can a¤ect the transmission of shocks and then, what the welfare implications of mortgage contracts are. There are unconstrained and constrained individuals that correspond to the savers and borrowers of the economy.
I explicitly introduce …xed and variable-rate mortgages, that is, constrained individuals can be of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who borrow at a …xed rate.
Model responses are in line with the intuition. A monetary policy shock a¤ects more strongly those individuals who are borrowing in economies in which the predominant type of mortgages is at variable rate. Consumption and housing demand decrease by more after an interest rate increase if constrained consumers are variable rate. In a general equilibrium framework, the partial equilibrium e¤ects are maintained, but muted by a redistribution between borrowers and savers and strong wealth e¤ects in labor supply decisions. GHH preferences generate larger aggregate di¤erences between the two scenarios considered.
Monetary policy shocks are not persistent. More persistent shocks such as technology or in ‡ation target shocks are able to generate much larger di¤erences in the aggregate economy. 30 Monetary policy responds to these shocks in a very persistent way causing large aggregate di¤erences between the …xed and the variable-rate economy. In ‡ation target shocks have more e¤ect on output in variable-rate economies.
On the contrary, technology shocks increase output by more in those economies mainly borrowing at a …xed rate, due to the procyclicality of real interest rates in this case.
From a normative perspective, I …nd that the optimal interest-rate response to in ‡ation by the central bank is weaker when a group of consumers need collateral to obtain loans, as compared to the standard sticky-price model. In ‡ation relaxes the collateral constraint and therefore reduces the distortions created by this extra friction. However, this channel is stronger the higher the proportion of …xed-rate mortgages in the economy. A high proportion of …xed-rate contracts is welfare enhancing.
The model presented here can set directions for future research. The proportion of …xed and variablerate mortgages is kept constant. A natural extension would be to endogeneize it by modelling the mortgage choice. For instance, borrowers could be heterogeneous in their risk aversions or marketpowered banks could price mortgages charging a spread on …xed-rate mortgages depending on economic conditions. Furthermore, this model is not able to keep track of the new …xed-rate mortgages issued every 3 0 This is also consistent with Krusell and Smith (1998) or Gourinchas (2001) . They study the e¤ects of the distribution of income and wealth and the implications of precautionary savings and life cycle for the macroeconomy in a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. Their results are not very di¤erent from what one would obtain in a representative agent model, behaviors of di¤erent agents practically o¤set each other in the aggregate when considering realistic parameter speci…cation. They also …nd that permanent shocks would generate larger e¤ects on the aggregate economy.
period. For tractability I assume that the …nancial intermediary charges an average of the new …xed interest rate and the old interest rate for …xed-rate mortgages every period. An overlapping generations version could solve this issue. It would also be interesting to study shock transmission and monetary policy in international versions of the model with heterogeneous mortgage structures across countries. Using (3) in the steady state we obtain R = 1= . From (19) and (20) we have that R = R = R = 1= .
Appendix 1: Tables and Figures
From the …rst order conditions for housing we can obtain the steady-state consumption-to-housing ratio for both constrained and unconstrained consumers:
where 1 e k e . From (13) and (27)we obtain the constrained and unconstrained consumption-to-output ratio in the steady state:
where X = "= (" 1)
The housing-to-output ratio for constrained and unconstrained consumers:
Log-Linearized Model
Equation (47) is the log-linearized market clearing condition for housing. Equation (48) is the housing margin for unconstrained consumers. Equation (49) is the analogous expression for constrained consumers.
Aggregate Supply
Equation (50) is the production function combined with labor market clearing. Equation (51) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve that relates in ‡ation positively to future in ‡ation and negatively to the markup ( e k (1 ) (1 ) = ). u t is a normally distributed cost-push shock.
Monetary Policy
b r t = b r t 1+ (1 ) [(1 + ) (b t b t ) + y b y t ] + e t :(52)
Alternative Model Speci…cations The Model with GHH Preferences
Under GHH preferences, savers maximize:
The …rst-order conditions are:
Note that consumption no longer appears in the labor-supply decision (equation (55)).
Similarly, we can obtain the …rst-order conditions for variable-rate borrowers:
The Model with Capital
We can add capital to the model so that unconstrained consumers have more saving choices. Since borrowers would not hold capital, the only part of the model that changes is the one of the unconstrained consumers:
Unconstrained consumers maximize their expected lifetime utility function:
subject to the budget constraint which includes capital:
(61)
So, in this case, savers can buy houses or sell them at the current price q t and hold bonds. They can also hold capital K t , whose price is normalized to unity, which they rent to …rms at rental price z t . is the depreciation rate of capital. Consumers also have to pay quadratic adjustment costs for capital.
Maximizing (60) subject to (61) ; we obtain the …rst-order conditions:
Now, we have a fourth …rst order condition, equation (65), which is the …rst order condition with respect to capital.
Unconstrained individuals are not going to hold capital in equilibrium so their problem remains unchanged.
Intermediate goods are going to be produced according to the following production function (ignoring technology):
where measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor and is the labor share.
Firms choose employment and capital to
subject to the production function, demand and the constraint imposed by nominal rigidity.
The …rst-order conditions for labor and capital demand are the following:
Non Separability between Housing and Non-Durable Consumption in the Utility Function
Unconstrained consumers consume an index of non-durable goods and housing de…ned as:
where is the share of housing in the composite consumption index and is the elasticity of substitution between non-durable consumption goods and housing.
Unconstrained consumers maximize an expected lifetime utility function with two arguments;
the consumption index and labor/leisure.
Subject to the budget constraint:
Maximizing (71) subject to (72) ; we obtain the …rst-order conditions:
In the same way, we have the problem of the variable-rate constrained consumers.
They also consume a consumption index that aggregates non-durable goods and housing:
Variable-rate constrained consumers maximize the lifetime utility function subject to the budget constraint and the collateral constraint: 
The …rst-order conditions for the consumers are:
(1 ) These …rst-order conditions di¤er from those of the unconstrained individuals. In the case of con-strained consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint ( cv t ) appears in the equations. The problem of the …nancial intermediary, the …rms and the monetary policy is identical to the baseline model.
A Two-Sector Model
We can relax the assumption that the housing supply is …xed and consider a two-sector model in which consumers can supply labor to the housing sector and the consumption sector.
Unconstrained consumers:
subject to the budget constraint: 
Maximizing (83) subject to (84) ; we obtain the …rst-order conditions: 
Equations (85) 
The …rst-order conditions are: 
The problem for the …nancial intermediary and the …nal good producer is identical to the baseline model. The problem for the intermediate good producer is slightly changed. Intermediate goods are produced according to the following production function:
where measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor.
Analogously, the production function for the housing sector is the following (ignoring technology): subject to the production function, demand and the constraint imposed by nominal rigidity.
The …rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following: 
Production function in which labor for savers and labor for borrowers are substitutes
The consumers' and …nancial intermediary's problem remains unchanged. However, the intermediate goods …rm's production function (ignoring technology) turns into the following one:
where ! is the size of the unconstrained group. subject to the production function, demand and the constraint imposed by nominal rigidity.
The …rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:
We see that in this case, the wage paid to each group is the same.
Aggregate variables are de…ned as follows:
